

Methodological Issues Concerning the Practical Availability of Work-Practice to EM & CA

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*Let the members do the talking. Transcription is for the scientists.
It gives them something to do.* [14]

Abstract. Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis are often talked of interchangeably, in the same breath, as being the same kind of ‘thing’, entertaining similar concerns, engaged in the empirical investigation of members construction of social reality, inspecting, exploring, and scrutinising the production of real world, real time phenomenon in doing so, sharing similar methodological presumptions in undertaking that work, and the rest. The presupposition of ‘sameness’ glosses and obscures, however, significant differences which set the two enterprises apart as distinct forms of socio-logical study and raises methodological issues concerning the practical availability of human work-practice to the two fields of inquiry? These are issues which Jeff Coulter, a leading figure in the field, recently described as “important in determining the future course of ethnomethodological studies” [2].

Keywords. Work-practice, Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis, Vulgar Competence.

Introduction. Coulter’s remarks are drawn, as are others documented herein, from recent debate on the Ethno Hotline, an electronically mediated discussion forum for practitioners working in the fields of Ethnomethodology (EM) and Conversation Analysis (CA).¹ The debate was, and is here, concerned with the practical availability of work-practice to EM and CA.

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The debate was provoked in many respects by David Sudnow’s recent tour of the seminar circuit in the UK. While Sudnow’s contribution to EM and CA has been negligible over recent years, he was an instrumental figure in the development of EM and CA studies of “ordinary” activities – i.e. of everyday work. Working closely with Harold Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and others, Sudnow was indeed a pioneer in the field of work-study.

Apart from providing unique historical insights into the emergence of EM and CA, and the characters that led that development, Sudnow’s recent tour of the UK seminar circuit notably (notoriously even) brought the adequacy of EM and CA methodologies into question. Public consideration of methodological adequacy and thus of the practical availability of work-practice in light of Sudnow’s comments has largely taken place amongst practitioners online. The purpose of this paper is to subject the issues raised by that forum of debate to more widespread and critical discussion. First, however, a preliminary note on what is meant by the notion of ‘work-practice’, which might permit something of a mutual understanding to evolve.

EM and CA might readily be described as socio-logical perspectives which seek to account for the orderliness of human activities - for their regular, reoccurring, routine, patterned, or ‘structured’ nature. Unlike the vast majority of their counterparts in the social sciences, EM and CA take the view that the orderly ‘structures’ of everyday life - such as those that characterise the home, the school, the hospital, the factory, the office, and *all* of the rest - are a members’ concerted accomplishment. In other words, the orderly ‘structures’ of everyday life are ‘put together’ in the actions and interactions of people.² As Garfinkel and Sacks describe it,

We shall speak of 'the work' of that accomplishment in order to gain the emphasis for it of an ongoing course of action. 'The work' is done as assemblages of practices ... [10 - p. 163]

So, in speaking of 'work-practice' EM and CA are speaking of the ways in which people produce the 'structured' environments within which they live and work. The work that people do together – their cooperative work - is not seen as separate from the 'structured' environment in which it occurs (as it is seen from virtually every other socio-logical perspective), but as intimately connected to the 'structured' environment it elaborates. Indeed, the 'structured' environment of the home, the school, the office, etc., is seen to be the *product of the work* that people do together. Thus, the orderly 'structures' of everyday life are seen and treated as the product of the cooperative work of members; work that is embodied in their actions and interactions (including their talk together).

Furthermore, in producing the orderly 'structures' of everyday life through the accomplishment of reoccurring or routine *courses of work*, we might speak of 'assemblages of practices' implicated in the production of the orderly 'structures' of everyday life. To speak of work-practice is, then, to speak of the accomplishment of the routine courses of work whereby the orderly 'structures' of everyday life are produced, and at the same time made recognisable for what they are in action and talk, by members of the ordinary society at large. Sharing something of such a notion of work-practice, EM and CA are, in principle, dedicated to accounting for – or describing – the practices whereby the orderly 'structures' that comprise the ordinary society we all know and live out our lives in as members, are produced by and made recognisable to members in their action and talk or their work together. This is not intended to define EM or CA, only to sensitise the reader to their respective orientations to the ordinary society.

Similarities in hand, as noted above EM and CA are also characterised by their differences, particularly in the ways in which the two attempt to account for work-practice. The adequacy of the accounting methodologies – or work-practices – of EM and CA are the primary topic here. Debate on the Ethno Hotline articulated a number of specific concerns as to the methodological adequacy of CA in particular, and alternate EM solutions, some of which are presented here. In keeping with the general tenor of the original debate, the methodological issues addressed by practitioners in their 'shoptalk' together on the Hotline are represented below not in terms of formal argument

but rather, in terms of email extracts in which those concerns were originally articulated. The purpose in doing this is to remain as faithful to the debate as possible (although it will probably be unsuccessful in this as one participant's point view often conflicts with another's, hence debate in the first place). In that respect, what is offered here should not be construed of as a formal position on anyone's part, but as "spontaneous reactions in an ongoing debate" over which there has, and continues to be, profound disagreement.³ This paper attempts to crystallise some of the central matters of contention that emerged in the course of the debate's unfolding as the author understood and continues to understand them. In that respect, the contributions of parties to the debate cited here should be understood as the personal interpretation – or misinterpretation – of the author rather than a wholly accurate explication of their individual points of view.

Of particular concern in practitioners' shoptalk together were, and are, methodological issues that concern the practical availability of work-practice to the two fields of investigation, and the relationship of Harvey Sacks to CA and EM studies. The following issues, each of which will be addressed individually throughout the rest of the paper, lay at the heart of the debate.

- ❑ CA methodologies are rendering practices which lose work-practice in their application.
- ❑ CA is a form of constructive analysis which loses work-practice in subsuming it under the workings of the turn-taking machine.
- ❑ The 'reasonableness' of CA accounts is underpinned by an implicit and erroneous cognitive model that provides for the inferential validity of the turn-taking machinery.
- ❑ Sacks work (*circa* 1974) supports an alternate 'radical' studies of work programme that eschews logical empiricism.
- ❑ The 'radical' programme replaces the concern to "construct an apparatus" with a concern to satisfy the unique adequacy requirement.
- ❑ Unique adequacy demands that the researcher develop a vulgar competence in the work-practice under study.
- ❑ Developing vulgar competence in work-practice is *the* challenge for anyone conducting EM or CA studies of work.

It should be said that what is presented here in treating these issues is but a characterisation of events. Over 200 emails were posted over the course of the debate, and it is impossible to exhaustive within the constraints

of this paper. As a contributor, the author can only select what he took to be the most important matters.

Rendering work-practice.

The issue of rendering emerged following a posting from Emanuel Schegloff (forwarded by John Heritage) which was intended to correct “misleading views” [13] promulgated in critical discussion of CA transcription in general [14], and the use of the latching symbol in particular.⁴ The latching symbol (=) became a topic of widespread discussion, and several examples of its use were circulated.

For example R: Wujeh do:.=
V:= I said did, he, get, hurt.
V: My wife // caught d' ki:d,=
R: Yeh.
V: = lightin' a fiyuh in Perry's celluh.
V: Well my son did it = I'm gladjer son didn' get hu:rt, .hh I said but ...

A host of technical issues were talked of – such as how and when to apply the latching symbol – although other, broader concerns were voiced too. In particular it was asked:

Where's the ordinary competence? What happened to members' practical reasoning and methods? They are not there in the talk, not observably, and not to members'. I'm sure those who use notation will tell me how wrong I am (but as Sacks noted in HIS Lectures "you can look and see how it's different, and whether it's different in the way that somebody said. Now that's probably a very short term possibility, so you'd better look while you can." [19 - p. 488]. Canonical CA has removed any possibility of seeing members' ordinary work AS members' ordinary work and put in its place an apparatus that orders that work AND THUS MAKES IT VISIBLE (and to a select few). [5]

The point being made here is that CA methodologies (such as transcription or Interaction Analysis) impose orderliness on the work. Orderliness is the product of applying procedures of description and analysis - of determining when and where to apply the latching symbol in conjunction with other symbols, for example - and not of the work-practices of parties to the work (who do not use latching symbols etc. to get *their* work done). Work-practice is ‘rendered’ then, and in terms of CA procedures of description and analysis, and not explicated.

A scientific license? Tom Wilson, a seasoned and well-respected veteran in the field, took issue with this account of CA work-practice.

Contrary to Andy's interpretation (and contrary also to Lynch and Bogen), Sacks is not making an epistemological point about some supposed special form of inquiry, but rather an historical point about the way empirical sciences develop: "primitive science" means merely a science in its early stage of development when little instruction, apparatus, or manipulative skill is needed to see the phenomena - a stage that passes quickly as a science accumulates knowledge and technique and evolves in conceptual sophistication. The empirical study of conversation was, Sacks said, in that early stage, but it would not last long. [23]

Wilson's point is that being able to “look and see how something's different, and whether it's different in the way that somebody said” is a characteristic only of “primitive science”. As that science proceeds, it will develop specialised methods. The specialised practices of CA are legitimated by science on this reading then, and they are not seen to impose an order on work but to explicate *its technical features*.

Not all parties to the debate were satisfied with Wilson's appeal to Sacks' naïve understanding of and appeal to science to legitimate CA accounting practices. -

Naturally, much of what I have said here depends on the reader accepting Lynch and Bogen's understanding of Sacks' work and its extreme importance. If you don't then my position can only be found wanting. Nonetheless, as Lynch and Bogen remind us, there is "no strong reason" why our studies should be "overshadowed by a mythological conception of 'scientific' destiny" [17 - p. 93]. [6]

The point here is that although natural science may well have evolved through the development of specialised methods, that does not mean that studies of work should develop in such ways. Particularly if it means that its phenomena - members' work-practices - disappear from view and are replaced by the workings of a technical apparatus (such as transcription devices).

Constructive analysis. What is otherwise being said here is that in putting scientifically legitimated constructions before work, a ‘primordial’ phenomenon is being lost. -

As Mike [Lynch] and Dave [Bogen] put it, in dealing with the naive production and recognisability of actions and events "Sacks identified a PRIMORDIAL phenomenon. This phenomenon can variously be described as 'seeing-what-someone-is-saying, 'instructed actions' or, in a more complicated locution, 'the intractable-reproducibility of social structures'" [17 - p. 93]. Strand one of Sack's work,

as accomplished by Schegloff, Jefferson, and others in the development of canonical CA, fails to make these primordial or 'radical' phenomena of order observable in naturally accountable details of their production and recognition in replacing members' ordinary practices with 'reasonable' constructive accounts. [6]

The purpose of the remark is to point that in insisting on the scientific legitimacy of specialised practices of description and analysis, work-practice disappears from view. As a direct consequence of applying CA procedures, we cannot see how work is produced and how it is made recognisable as the work that it is for members. We are instead offered technical specifications of work - i.e. what the work looks like in and through the 'reasonable' *analytic construction* of the turn-taking machine to which CA's specialised practices are tied.

Simply put, 'constructive analysis' means that 1) we have a (socio-logical) construction, such as the turn-taking machine upon which CA stands [18], and 2) that work is described and analysed in terms of that construction. The turn-taking machine specifies a collection of components and a rule-set for their deployment. The analyst's task thus becomes one of explicating work in terms of the turn-taking machinery said to "govern" interaction, albeit in a "party-administered" fashion [18]. The concern here is not so much with the turn-taking machine [see 16 for a thorough account of that particular social construction] but with its 'reasonableness' and, thus, with the intellectual authority upon which CA stands.

The 'reasonable' character of CA constructs. Jeff Coulter articulates the concern with CA constructs as follows. -

Here's the nub, so to speak. I have problems with the cognitivist implications of ascribing to conversational participants such activities as, e.g., 'designing their utterances', 'analysing the talk of another', 'selecting a category to use', and the like. These are practices being imputed to speaker-hearers without in any way their demonstrably satisfying criteria for such ascriptions ... it is just such criterionless action-attributions which lead to mentalistic conceptions - they are not doing these activities explicitly, so they MUST (so the story goes) be doing them MENTALLY, unconsciously, sub-consciously, and so forth ... 'recipient-design' is not something a speaker DOES [however], but is, rather, a logical property of the utterances produced. 'Selecting a category' is not something a speaker DOES, but, rather, they speak such that categories are used according to rules, etc., etc. I still don't have this argument clearly developed, but the idea that 'members' are ongoing ANALYSTS strikes me as a gross over-intellectualisation of the praxis of speaking and hearing

... [one in which ordinary people] are depicted as sorts of proto-conversation-analysts themselves. [3]

The turn-taking rule-set furnishes a means of instruction that provides for the availability of work-practice in details of the ordered particulars of the turn-taking machine. Particulars such as recipient design, turn-constructive and allocation components, adjacency pairs, etc. The 'reasonableness' of the turn-taking machine stands on the *chain of inference* it sets up between these components and the rule-set, all of which trades on the implicit assumption that these things accurately depict speaker-hearer practices. Yet speakers-hearers do not speak and hear in such ways - ordinary people are not "proto-conversation-analysts". The 'reasonableness' of CA thus trades on a generic inferential apparatus of instruction that provides axiomatic principles for extrapolating from a Cartesian-style model, rather than on instruction through the descriptive **display** of members' work-practices. To see the sense of this remark, the reader will have be familiar with [18] or [16] or both preferably. Ultimately, canonical CA accounts lack 'praxiological validity' [12]. That is to say that they miss the 'interactional what' of work and work-practice in subsuming work-practice under the ubiquitous workings of the turn-taking machine.⁵

Recovering the 'primordial' phenomenon. The effort to recover work-practice eschews the logical empiricism that underpins CA's technologies of production [11]. Eschews, that is, the idea that work-practice may be made available through the *transformation* of the 'data' on the audio or video tapes through transcription, etc. Parties to the debate argued that such procedures of work were not of Sacks' devising but of Emanuel Schegloff's, Gail Jefferson's, and others (and should be acknowledged as such). While undoubtedly licensed by Sacks, it was argued that an alternate to canonical CA was also made possible by Sacks. -

"I have a bunch of stuff and I want to see whether an order for it exists. Not that I want to try to order it, but I want to see whether there's some order to it." [20 - p. 622]

So what I'm getting at is not denying Sacks' involvement in the historical development of canonical CA but saying (much more clearly now I hope) that his work at the same time provided for other forms of investigation directed towards the study of 'radical phenomena' of order (hence his involvement with Garfinkel). Indeed, that the concern with radical phenomenon of order - that is, with orderliness as the naturally accountable practical accomplishment of members and not of the workings of some underlying turn-taking machine,

for example - preceded CA but got lost in the course of naive explorations of the logical order of natural science and in the subsequent development of formal procedures of analysis. [6]

It is not being suggested here that Sacks initiated the 'radical' studies of work programme (that is Garfinkel's achievement) only that his early work also provided for such investigation. According to the 'radical' programme, *no specialised apparatus is required* for the study of work but rather, the satisfaction of the unique adequacy requirement.

Unique adequacy. This is a requirement that the analyst be *with members* in a "concerted competence of methods" [11]. CA, as the vast majority of sociological perspectives, passes members competence in their everyday work by. It does so as it has no interest in 'unique adequacy' but in 'generic organisations', 'formal apparatus', abstract 'structures' and 'systems', etc. [8]. -

In its weak use the unique adequacy requirement of methods is identical with the requirement that for the analyst to recognise, or identify, or follow the development of, or describe phenomenon of order in local production of coherent detail the analyst must be vulgarly competent in the local production and reflexively natural accountability of the phenomenon of order he is 'studying'. [11 - p. 182]

What does that mean? Simply put, it means that the work analyst must be able to understand work in such ways as parties to its production and recognition understand it. Or, in other words, that the work analyst develop the capacity to see what is going on, and in the ways that it is going on, as production cohorts (members) see it. The work analyst must be vulgarly competent in the field of practical action under "study". Vulgar competence is not a transcendent capacity but an occasioned one – i.e. a requirement that must be satisfied on each and every occasion of work-study. The unique adequacy requirement can only be satisfied by "studying" the work closely. That is, by immersing one's self in the work and thereby coming to terms with its *in vivo* practicalities. Being able to see the work as production cohorts see it, and in the ways they see it as what it is for them, provides the basis for writing praxiologically valid accounts. That is, corrigible accounts of work-practice that may be evaluated, assessed, amended, and otherwise confirmed or rejected *by members* [12].

Vulgar competence? A practical example of what 'vulgar competence' means is provided by Paul ten Have. –

A few years ago, in a data session in Amsterdam, we were discussing some materials on a medical consultation's diagnostic phase. The patient voiced a number of complaints and we felt that the physician was not taking some of these up. One of us, however, Charon Pierson [note: should read Pierson], of the School of nursing of the University of Hawaii and a student and collaborator of Britt Robillard, used her professional expertise to point out that some of his subsequent questions were motivated by some of the complaints we thought he did not attend to. In other words, from a professional perspective, he was working on those complaints, but this was not noticeable for us, non-medical overhearers, and indeed for the patient. So from a CA perspective, we could understand some of the patient's repetitions of her complaints as dealing with 'notable absences' on the doctor's part, while we were not getting the fine details of his 'diagnostic work' qua professional practice.

This episode reminded me of the limitations of a 'standard' (?) CA approach ... But rather than leading to a denouncement of it [CA], I would suggest to try to collaborate [with the radical studies of work programme], based on mutual understanding. Or is this just a Sunday morning sentiment? [22]

Charon Pierson's background in nursing enabled her to see and hear what was going on, and in the ways that it was, in the course of diagnosis. She was, and is, vulgarly competent in diagnostic practice (to some degree at least). Developing vulgar competence in the field of practical action that constitutes the domain of "study" is a matter of paramount concern *if* the real world orderliness of work is to be made available for consideration.

So much for Sunday morning sentiments. Despite the best of intentions, vulgar competence is not available to CA. –

Let me give you a story. Gail Jefferson once tried transcribing Sacks' lecturing using her notation. She told me she was confounded by not being able to hear him lecturing when she was transcribing his lectures. Given my interests, her admission was catastrophic. She was not able to listen for the technical sociological things he was talking as the matters that conversational structures could be but was able to listen for and hear her notationally indicated conversational structures. Instead of hearing him talk sociology in just the way he was talking-it-really-and-evidently and ordinarily, the details of Sacks talking conversational structures were exhibited in established conversational indicators. She detected properties that exhibited his lecture as the details of talking conversationally. So what? A conversational analysis of persons

talking chemistry or talking law will have to respect the fact that they are talking chemistry or talking law. Say that between us, at the blackboard, we are talking chemistry. What does that look like in conversational structures? Right now the answer is nothing, zilch, it can't be done in CA. Harold Garfinkel in conversation with Benetta Jules-Rosette cited in [7]

The vulgar competence that work-practice consists of, and relies on for its production and recognition, is simply not available to canonical CA – to the form of conversation analysis developed by Schegloff, Jefferson, and others. Its technologies of production get in the way, systematically removing that competence. One might well ask why, or how?

The practical unavailability of work-practice to CA.

Although Tom Wilson disagrees profoundly with many of the 'radical' readings articulated here (as is his prerogative), he nevertheless elaborates the why and how of the matter with a distinct clarity. -

More generally, for Garfinkel the term "radical phenomena" refers to things having very specific characteristics, and these must be respected in any discussion: radical phenomena

"are available to policies of ethnomethodology - for example, they are available under the exercise of "ethnomethodological indifference" and they are available under a respect for the unique adequacy requirement of methods. But they are specifically *not* available to the policies and methods of constructive analysis. These phenomena cannot be recovered with *a priori* representational methods. They are not demonstrable in the established terms of classic studies." (1988, p. 107; see also pp. 107-108, and his 1992 and 1996 papers)

I take "*a priori* representational methods" to refer to the use of notions formulated prior to a present inquiry into some concrete situation currently at hand; even if those notions were developed in close engagement with empirical materials, they are antecedent to the present inquiry, and, Garfinkel held, radical phenomena cannot be captured by such notions [24].

Transcript notations, procedures of Interaction Analysis, analytic devices such as turn-constructive units (etc.) *are*, quite unequivocally, *a priori* representational methods. They configure before hand what the phenomena will be, what it will look like, what it consists of, and the rest. Notably, Wilson argues that transcripts should not be understood so much as representations of "data", but as "heuristic tools" through the use of which the "data" (i.e. work) may be inspected. If that is the case – if transcripts are

but heuristic devices (which is fair enough) - then CA becomes a very different creature than it is claimed to be by Schegloff and Co. however.

The challenge of work analysis. Whatever the pros and cons of methods for work analysis, *the* challenge for the work analyst is first and foremost to develop vulgar competence in the field of "study", rather than developing *a priori* and generic representational methods. Jeff Coulter makes the point with some force.

There is one significant objection I want to register, and register firmly. It is this. There is an idea abroad (probably promulgated by a few profoundly pretentious scientists who want to be would-be philosophers or sociologists) that NO-ONE who is not actually a scientist (a psychiatrist, a coroner, a cop, etc.) is in any position to write about, analyse, discuss, theorise about (etc.) THEIR sanctimonious work. This crap has got to stop. What is the issue here? Ian Hacking's fine book, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? goes a long way to this disabusing of sealed off – esoteric - and thus, off-limits "competence". What a joke. If an ethnomethodologist worth his salt doesn't command enough competence to work in whatever area he or she chooses to, that will be his or her downfall. But the very idea that an ethnomethodologist (just by virtue of his or her training in Sociology!!) simply CANNOT be inducted into the ways of other people's professional expertise strikes me as a canard. And an insulting one as well. [4]

In saying this, Coulter is not simply cautioning natural scientists, but social scientists as well! The caution is not one that demands of the ethnomethodologist, conversation analyst, or work analyst more generally, that he or she be competent in the analytic arts that characterise Sociology or the social sciences more generally, but that he or she be competent in the field of practical action that constitutes the domain of "study". In other words, Coulter's is a demand that the work analyst be vulgarly competent. That is not an insignificant challenge, indeed the social sciences as we know them would be utterly transformed were "experts" to be vulgarly competent in the fields of practical action the profess to "know about".

Achieving vulgar competence? Insofar as one might accept the challenge, the question becomes one as to how vulgar competence might be achieved on any occasion of inquiry? In many respects answers to that question will be the *outcome* of addressing the problem *in situ*. Nevertheless, one general and significant guideline might foster such outcomes. -

In order to adequately appreciate the orderliness of naturally occurring social interaction AS it naturally

occurs, the analyst needs to acquire vulgar competence in the phenomenon he or she is 'studying'. But CA is not interested in that (at least as the discipline has so often been described here [on the Ethno Hotline] by those with a vested interest in it). Fair enough. 'Radical EM' objections aren't about that - aren't about CA doing 'radical' studies. They are about how CA stops you doing 'radical' studies. The solution to the problem occasioned by CA is not, somehow, to put the two approaches together but to ask a rather different question:

"Following the critical discussion of formulating in conversation by Garfinkel & Sacks, however, questions can be raised about what members are doing when they do taking a turn at talk. This is not the same as asking what the turn-taking machine is doing when members talk to one another" [16 - p. 253]

That way we preserve an interest in talk in interaction but it is an interest directed towards the orderliness of what's going on, what's being done. [8]

Making work-practice available requires a disciplinary shift in focus, away from the turn-taking machine to what members are doing when they take turns at talk. Talk, in other words, should be treated as a *tool* that people use to get their activities done together. In that respect, and quite unlike Heidegger's Hammer, the turn-taking machine misses the tool's embodied *extension*, its *use*, its *connexion* with the real world *in practice*. Rather than ask what is it about talk that engenders cooperation (concerted action), *pace* canonical CA, refocusing the issue directs our attention to how people do what they do together in and through talking, thus coordinating their actions. Directs our attention, that is, to the assemblages of work practices in and through the accomplishment of which inner orders of interpretative work are ordered and the familiar 'structures' of everyday life are produced in members work-practices.

What more: 'radical' studies of work. CA is now an established tradition in the social sciences, a "normal science research programme" in Mike Lynch's words. The methodological arguments articulated here are not concerned with criticising CA's achievements and they should not be read as such. They are concerned with the practical availability of work to EM and CA. As such, the methodological arguments should be understood as saying something to the effect that whatever CA's achievements, it cannot as yet handle the real world of work and work-practice. That work-practice is practically unavailable to canonical CA's accounting practices and production technologies. The

issue, then, is not one concerning the adequacy of CA as a socio-logical discipline *per se*, but rather of the need to adapt CA if it is to be able to deal with work in the real world (in contrast to constructive analysis). What more does CA need to do in order to be able to adequately account for real-world work-practice?

"Methods" (whether avowedly scientific or not) do not provide a priori guarantees, and the initial requirement for an ethnomethodological investigator is [therefore] to find ways to elucidate methods from within the relevant competence systems to which they are bound. [15 - p. 147]

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Notes.

¹ Ethno Hotline <http://www.cios.org/www/ethno.htm>

² 'Structure' is placed in quotes to indicate that it stands as a shorthand term for the 'orderly character of activities in the home, the school, the office, etc'.

³ Paul ten Have, commenting on the nature of the Hotline debate (personal communication).

⁴ It is fair to say that Schegloff's response to Kelly was more to rebuke David Sudnow, who Kelly had been citing and who is highly critical of Schegloff's work [21], than it was to address Kelly in particular.

⁵ Jeff Coulter provides us with an example that makes the point concisely here. Consider the following utterances:

A: What are you hiding from me?

B: Nothing!

Coulter points out that Sacks himself argues that although these utterances may be analysed in terms of the adjacency pair ‘question-answer’, this would miss the point that what was being done in the talk, by the talk, was the *making* of an accusation and the rebuttal, the *denial*, of that accusation! [1]. Although the grammatical rule-set could easily be applied to the talk and the talk (thus) made out such that it appears to be ordered according to that rule-set and its components, to do so would be to miss the ‘inner temporal course of interpretive work’ [9] accomplished in and through the talk, and to miss how that course of work was observably and reportably ordered in terms of members’ local work-practices. What we see instead through canonical CA is the work of the turn-taking machine and not the work of members, nor their practices for ordering that work.

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