# A Practical Approach to Co-induction in Twelf

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#### Motivation

- Common complaint (see the POPLmark challenge): *Twelf* is a great system but is cannot do "(insert your favorite theorem prover feature)" and somebody says, you may as well junk it.
- We are going to show a way to do proofs by co-induction in Twelf now.
- No change to the Twelf's meta-theory, hence the totality checker is available.
- The basic idea: dating back Milner's CCS [1980]: define, whenever possible, your co-inductive relation, *inductively*. Mentioned also in Miller et al 1997.
- No free lunch: It's a bit awkward and better seen as an incentive to develop the appropriate meta-theory. Still, all proofs in Milner [1980] are inductive. In general, proof by co-induction are sporadic (only 3 co-inductive lemmas in Howe's proof of congruence of applicative bisimulation)

## Technical development

- Start with a set-theoretic characterization of a (co)inductive definition. A *rule* set  $\mathcal{R}$  [Aczel 77], a possibly (denumerable) infinite set of pairs  $\langle G, a \rangle$  (notation:  $a \leftarrow G$ ) on an universe  $\mathcal{U}$ , such that  $a \in \mathcal{U}, G \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{U}}$ .
- there is an alternative characterization via fix points of monotone operators: let  $\Phi_{\mathcal{R}}: 2^{\mathcal{U}} \to 2^{\mathcal{U}}$  and define  $\Phi_{\mathcal{R}}(A) = \{a \in \mathcal{U} \mid a \leftarrow G \in \mathcal{R}, G \subseteq A\}$
- The set *co-inductively* defined by  $\mathcal R$  is the greatest  $\mathcal R$ -dense set, namely  $CId(\mathcal R)=\bigvee\{A\ |\ A\subseteq\Phi_{\mathcal R}(A)\}$

$$\frac{\exists A . a \in A \qquad A \subseteq \Phi_{\mathcal{R}}(A)}{a \in CId(\mathcal{R})}CI$$

## Technical development, cont'ed

- From Tarski's theorem, if  $\Phi_{\mathcal{R}}$  is monotone, by repeated application to the empty set, it will converge to the set inductively defined by the rule set; if it is continuous, it will converge at most in  $\omega$  steps.
- What about the dual? Can we characterize gfix via iteration of the operator to the universe of discourse? Yes, provided it satisfies co-continuity (preservation of meet's)

$$T_0 = \mathcal{U}$$
 $T_{n+1} = \Phi_{\mathcal{R}}(T_n)$ 
 $T_{\omega} = \bigcap \{T_k \mid k \in \omega\} = gfix(\Phi_{\mathcal{R}})$ 

 In practical terms, we are looking for decidable conditions on the "shape" of the definition, so that co-continuity holds. One such example is "finite branching", as we will see.

# First example: divergence in the untyped $\lambda$ -calculus

$$\frac{\uparrow e_1}{\uparrow (e_1 e_2)} \operatorname{div} - \operatorname{app1} \qquad \frac{e_1 \Downarrow \lambda x. e}{\uparrow (e_1 e_2)} \stackrel{\uparrow}{} \operatorname{div} - \operatorname{app2}$$

- The gfix of this rules encode divergence. However, it can be shown (trust me, it follows from determinism if evaluation) that the associated operator is co-continuous, so the set can be computed inductively:
- So, let's write some Twelf code. First declarations for expressions and lazy evaluation. I assume familiarity with Twelf's idea of encoding theorem as relation between type families that need to be verified as total functions.

# Evaluation in the lazy $\lambda$ -calculus

```
exp : type.
lam : (exp -> exp) -> exp. %%% Note HOAS here
app : \exp -> \exp -> \exp.
%block L1: block {x:exp}. %%% Ignore this for now
%worlds (L1) (exp).
eval : exp -> exp -> type.
%mode +{E:exp} -{V:exp} eval E V.
ev_lam : eval (lam E) (lam E).
ev_app : eval (app E1 E2) V
   <- eval E1 (lam E1')
   <- eval (E1' E2) V. %% note subst as meta-level application
```

## Divergence in the untyped $\lambda$ -calculus: inductive encoding

```
%% fixed point indexes
index : type.
zz : index.
ss : index -> index.
ndiverge: index -> exp -> type. %% divergence has additional argumen
%mode ndiverge +N +E.
divbase : ndiverge zz E. %% everything diverges at stage zero
div_app1 : ndiverge (ss N) (app E1 E2)
            <- ndiverge N E1.
div_app2 : ndiverge (ss N) (app E1 E2)
            <- eval E1 (lam E)
            <- ndiverge N (E E2).
```

#### Adequacy

• Finally, say that  $diverge\ e$  iff  $\forall k$ : index. ndiverge k e. Why is this correct? One direction, easy induction on "k" (formalised in Isabelle/HOL with the newly revamped Hybrid06 package, where  $\uparrow$  is implemented as a HOL's co-inductive definition):

$$\uparrow$$
 e  $\rightarrow \forall k$ : index. ndiverge k e

- Other way: need to apply CI rule, hence to show that ndiverge is a "simulation". This follows from definitions and from the fact that the (big-step) evaluation is determinate.
- CAVEAT: co-induction is defined meta-theoretically, via universal quantification. It cannot be queried existentially as a standard logic program. The preservation of the invariant must be checked at every stage of the fixed point construction.

#### Proving $\Omega$ diverges

- Theorem: the Ω combinator diverge. The standard formal proof (in HOL) requires to guess the right simulation, which is in this case {omega} and afterward a 10 commands script. In Coq you can use the *CoFix* tactics and guarded induction, but of course it clashes with HOAS and the overall soundness still an issue.
- You write this relation in Twelf . . .

## Proving $\Omega$ diverges, cont'ed

... and have it checked for totality:

```
%mode +{I:index} -{Q:diverge I omega} (divomegaR I Q).
%worlds () (divomegaR _ _).
%total I (divomegaR I P).
```

• Luckily, the Carsten's meta-theorem prover will also find it for you:

## Applicative simulation (Ong-Abramski)

The largest relation defined by:

$$\frac{\forall e'.e \Downarrow \lambda x.e' \to \exists f': \Downarrow f \ \lambda x.f' \land \ \forall m.e'[m/x] \leq f'[m/x]}{e \leq f} \sin \theta$$

- Let's play the same trick:  $e \le f$  implies  $\forall n : index. sim n e f$ . Conversely, sim n e f is indeed a simulation.
- Note that, by the reduced syntax of LF (no existentials), we have to split the judgment into two so that F' is correctly quantified.
- However, the use of hypothethical judgments obliterates the difference between simulation and its *open* extension, which saves us some serious pain while formalising the proofs.

## Applicative simulation: Twelf encoding

```
sim : index -> exp -> exp -> type.
%mode sim +N +E +F.
simbody : index -> (exp -> exp) -> exp -> type.
%mode simbody +N +E +F.
sim all : sim zz E F.
                                    % everything goes at step 0
simf : sim (ss I) E F
      <- ({E':exp -> exp} eval E (lam E')
                 -> simbody I E' F).
     : simbody I E' F
sb
          <- eval F (lam F')
          \leftarrow ({m:exp} sim I (E' m) (F' m)).
```

#### A tiny bit of meta-theory: reflexivity of simulation

```
% Reflexitivity of simulation
nsimrefl: {N : index} {E : exp} sim N E E -> type.
%mode nsimrefl +I +E -D.
nsimr z : nsimrefl zz sim all.
nsimr s : nsimrefl (ss N)
          (simf
     ([e:exp -> exp][u : eval E1 (lam e)] sb ([x:exp] NS e u x) u))
   <- ({e:exp \rightarrow exp} {u :eval E1 (lam e)} {x:exp} nsimrefl N _ (NS e u
%block L2 : some {E:exp} block {e:exp -> exp}{u:eval E (lam e)} {x:exp}
%worlds (L1 | L2) (exp).
%worlds (L2) (nsimrefl \_ \_ \_).
%total M (nsimrefl M _ _).
```

#### Conclusion: what have we learned?

- What I've shown today is little more than a patch.
- However, it shows that with a very little thought you do nnot need to rubbish a system such as Twelf for lacking a feature you may deem fundamental.
- It may be intersting to play out some more extensive examples (Howe's proof) to see the limitations of this approach.
- At the same time, I think that there is mounting evidence that co-induction should be a first class citizen in Twelf-land.